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Introduction 
 
This chapter critically explores ‘professional ethical wisdom’ as the disposition to 
engage in judicious practical deliberation in workplace situations in which matters of 
harm, benefit, rights and responsibilities are at stake. This entails sensitivity to 
ethically salient features of situations; empathy with the feelings, values, desires and 
perspectives of others; the capacity to exercise moral imagination; and good 
judgement regarding the right course of action in the light of defensible reasons.   
 
While the capacity to reason and make good judgments is important in professional 
ethics, this is often emphasised at the expense of the less visible work of moral 
perception, imagination and emotion. This chapter examines these aspects of 
professional ethical wisdom in the social welfare professions (which cover such fields 
as child protection, mental health, elderly care, disability services, youth justice, 
youth work and community development). In these fields, the relationship between 
service users and professional practitioners is sometimes uninvited or unwelcome. 
Professional workers often act as publicly accountable agents of the state, yet also 
develop relationships based on personal engagement with service users and may 
have a strong sense of vocation. How, then, do they develop as ethical practitioners, 
negotiate roles and responsibilities, and make difficult ethical judgements and 
decisions?     
 
Drawing on a practice example of the experiences of a psychiatric social worker, the 
chapter introduces the concept of ‘ethics work’ as a feature of professional ethical 
wisdom.  
 
The rough terrain of social welfare work 
 
Before elaborating on what I mean by ‘professional ethical wisdom’, I will first 
introduce the social welfare professions and briefly describe the nature of their work. 
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Social welfare professions include social, youth and community work. Such 
professions work with people experiencing difficulties in their lives and employ 
processes or strategies of care, control, informal education, empowerment and 
social support. The core underpinning values of these practices include the 
promotion of social welfare, social justice and human rights. While they work with 
individuals and groups to improve the circumstances of their lives, they also have an 
explicit purpose to work for social change: to challenge inequality and injustice and 
promote fairness and the social participation of individuals and groups. The following 
global definition of social work illustrates how one of these professions frames its 
purpose: 
 
Social work is a practice-based profession and an academic discipline that 
promotes social change and development, social cohesion, and the 
empowerment and liberation of people. Principles of social justice, human 
rights, collective responsibility and respect for diversities are central to social 
work.  Underpinned by theories of social work, social sciences, humanities 
and indigenous knowledge, social work engages people and structures to 
address life challenges and enhance wellbeing. (International Association of 
Schools of Social Work and International Federation of Social Workers, 2014)    
 
Like others, the professional practices of social welfare have been subject in recent 
decades to increasing state regulation, managerial emphasis on reaching targets 
and measuring outcomes, privatisation of former public services, introduction of 
competition, emphasis on efficiency and profitability, and growing technicisation of 
practice (relying on protocols, proformas, manuals and checklists) (Harris, 2003; 
Banks, 2004; Harris and White, 2009; Banks, 2011). Austerity measures introduced 
in many countries have exacerbated these trends, adding to the push towards the 
greater independence of service users (‘responsibilisation’, see Juhila et al, 2017) 
and local community organisations and volunteers filling gaps in welfare services left 
by withdrawal of state provision. 
 
As in the professional practice of teaching, there is a strong government agenda that 
defines and constrains the way work is done. However, there is more societal 
ambivalence towards social welfare professions, insofar as these work with people 
often regarded as undeserving and dangerous. As in the practice of health care, 
ethical problems are commonplace –  relating to unmet needs, resource allocation 
and the difficulty of responding to service users’ desires as opposed to doing what 
professional practitioners consider to be in their best interests or what the policies 
and procedures of governments and welfare agencies require or allow. Arguably the 
challenges are even more pressing and uncomfortable in the social welfare field, 
since the public interest is more overtly at stake in this work. Furthermore, the social 
solidarity embodied in public welfare systems that support people in times of need is 
increasingly in question, making the social justice mission of the social welfare 
professions even harder to retain.  
 
The points just made suggest that social welfare work is a controversial or contested 
field. Honig’s (1996, p. 259) concept of ‘dilemmatic space’ may be useful here. This 
is a term she uses to describe the ever-present conflicts that lie under the surface in 
social orders – conflicts that crystallise periodically in the form of dilemmas: 
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Rather than springing up ab initio, dilemmas are actually the eventful 
eruptions of a turbulence that is always there. They are the periodic 
crystallisations of incoherences and conflicts in social orders and their 
subjects. (Honig,1996, p. 259) 
 
The metaphor of a turbulent space (or ‘terrain’ as I have called it) has resonances 
with others in the literature on phronesis and/or professional judgement, such as 
Dunne’s  (1997) ‘rough ground’ (taken from Wittgenstein) and Schön’s (1991) 
‘swampy lowlands’. Likewise, Saario (2014), expressing the response of mental 
health practitioners in Finland to audit regimes, uses the metaphor of the rough sea, 
and describes the professional work as ‘tacking’ (sailing against the wind, avoiding 
obstacles and difficulties). Whichever metaphor we use, however, the professional 
journey is fraught with challenges, and the ability of practitioners to navigate the 
turbulent context in which they work seems to require a range of human qualities 
such as mental agility, perceptual acuity, sensitivity to context, courage, 
commitment, good judgement, practical knowledge, collaborative working and 
appreciating the wider political context in which they operate. In philosophical and 
professional language such qualities have often been associated with practical 
wisdom (phronesis) and more specifically professional wisdom.         
         
The domain of professional ethical wisdom 
 
I shall now discuss what is meant by ‘professional ethical wisdom’, elaborating on 
the concept of ‘wisdom’ that I have in mind and explaining why I have qualified it with 
the terms ‘ethical’ and ‘professional’.   
 
First, I will consider the ‘ethical’ in ‘professional ethical wisdom’. The concept of 
wisdom at work here has its origins in Aristotle’s notion of ‘phronesis’ (often 
translated as ‘practical wisdom’), which he describes as ‘a true and reasoned state of 
capacity to act with regard to the things which are good or bad for human beings’ 
(Aristotle, 350 BCE/1954p. 142 [VI, 5, 1140b 4-6]). According to many interpretations 
of Aristotle, the ethical or moral is part of the meaning of ‘phronesis’ (in this chapter I 
am using the terms ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ interchangeably). For example, Hughes 
(2001, p. 86) describes practical wisdom as ‘being good at thinking morally’, and 
comments (op. cit, p. 85) that: 
 
… Aristotle has in mind something which comes close to a moral use; as he 
puts it, to have practical wisdom is to be good at thinking about how to live a 
fulfilled and worthwhile life as a whole. 
 
Aristotle offers conflicting accounts (and has certainly been interpreted in different 
ways) regarding whether practical wisdom involves both thinking about what counts 
as a fulfilled life (qua end) as well as how (by what means) this might be achieved in 
particular circumstances; or whether it is only concerned with deliberating on the 
means to ultimate fulfilment. Following Hughes, I subscribe to the first interpretation, 
which entails that practical wisdom is ‘concerned with good actions, whose goodness 
is intrinsic to the actions themselves’ (Hughes, 2001, p. 94).   
 
If this chapter was to be faithful to these Aristotelian sources, then I should arguably 
use the term ‘practical wisdom’ rather than ‘ethical wisdom’, insofar as the 
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Aristotelian ‘practical’ clearly includes the ethical. However, in modern usage, 
‘practical’ is not inevitably associated with the ethical and might also include the 
sphere of technical activity or skill that need not be significantly ethical. So I have 
used the adjective ‘ethical’ to make it clear that we are looking at wisdom practised in 
the ethical sphere, which covers matters relating to the promotion of human and 
ecological flourishing, concerning harms, benefits, rights and responsibilities.  
 
Having considered why I have used the term ‘ethical wisdom’, the next question is 
why ‘professional ethical wisdom’? This is shorthand for ‘ethical wisdom in 
professional life’ and qualifies further the domain in which I am interested. In this 
regard, the main questions to be explored are those of: ‘what counts as ethical 
wisdom? and ‘how is this deployed by professional workers in the context of their 
practice?’ To be sure, the term ‘professional wisdom’ was introduced relatively 
recently into the literature on the professions, and is often used quite loosely. 
Sometimes the literature ‘professional wisdom’ has a definite ethical focus, and is 
rooted explicitly in the Aristotelian concept of phronesis. But there are other 
examples of literature that take a much broader concept of professional wisdom 
encompassing many domains of professional practice (not significantly focused on 
the ethical) and covering other types of expertise, competence and skills besides 
phronesis. This range of interpretations is apparent in an edited collection (Bondi et 
al., 2011) and special issue of a journal (Clark et al., 2009), both of which draw on an 
inter-disciplinary conference on professional wisdom held in Edinburgh in 2008. 
Again, in the introductory chapter to another edited volume on practical wisdom in 
professional practice, Kinsella and Pitman (2012, p. 2) refer to the ‘slippery’ nature of 
the concept of phronesis, and the ‘diaspora of meanings’ revealed by different 
contributors.  
 
Still, what is largely common to this literature on professional wisdom is a worry 
about the increasing focus on technical rationality and managerial accountability in 
professional practices, which is limiting the scope to exercise discretionary 
judgement based on practitioners’ expertise and values (Banks and Gallagher, 2009; 
Dunne, 2011; Kinsella and Pitman, 2012; Banks, 2013). As Kinsella and Pitman 
(2012, p. 2) remark, there is concern about what is missing from the official 
discourse on the nature of professional knowledge, ‘a practical disjunction between 
the knowledge required for practice and … current conceptions of what constitutes 
legitimate knowledge’.  Responding to this concern cannot simply entail giving an 
account of Aristotle’s concept of phronesis and applying it to twenty-first century 
professional life. As some commentators have pointed out, we do not live in 
Aristotle’s world (Hughes, 2001, pp. 211-221; Ellet, 2012). However, phronesis 
seems a useful starting point, and some of the key features identified by Aristotle 
may provide a framework for the kind of knowledge we are seeking. 
 
Aristotle distinguishes phronesis (practical wisdom) that is context-dependent and 
involves deliberation informed by moral or other values from both episteme 
(theoretical wisdom) that is universal and independent of context and techne 
(productive wisdom) that is context-dependent but directed towards the instrumental 
production of various useful goods. In developing his account of professional 
wisdom, Dunne (2011, p. 17) outlines the following key features of phronesis, based 
on Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, which I have re-organised as a list, largely 
using Dunne’s own words, as follows: 
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 Its role as an action-orienting form of knowledge; 
 Its irreducibly experiential nature; 
 Its entanglement with character; 
 Its non-confinement to generalised propositional knowledge; 
 Its need to embrace the particulars of relevant action-situations within its grasp of 
universals; 
 Its ability to engage in the kind of deliberative process that can yield concrete, 
context-sensitive judgments.  
 
The essence of Aristotle’s concept of phronesis lies in its role in ordering the moral 
virtues (such as justice, courage and trustworthiness). A person of practical wisdom 
has a general disposition towards virtuous action; and practical wisdom is required to 
balance and unify diverse virtues: for example, to judge when courage is required as 
opposed to generosity, or at what point in this or that situation courage becomes 
foolhardiness. As Aristotle (350BCE/1954, p. 158 [1144b29-1145a11]) himself 
observes: 
 
It is clear then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be good in 
the strict sense without practical wisdom, or practically wise without moral 
virtue. 
 
  
The role of professional ethical wisdom 
 
Drawing on both Aristotle’s account of phronesis and recent specialised literature on 
professional wisdom or phronesis in professional life, I will now briefly identify what I 
consider to be some important features relevant to the ethical concerns of the social 
welfare professions. Based on the account just given, professional ethical wisdom 
may be described as involving both reason and emotion; a grasp of both universal 
and particular features of situations; and deliberation on both ends and means. In the 
context of social welfare work which, as described earlier, has a social justice 
mission and is often located in welfare (state) systems, it seems important to develop 
a concept of phronesis that also takes account of power and the political context of 
the work. Here the work of Flyvberg (2001), Kemmis (2012) and others is useful in 
calling attention to the importance of understanding the workings of power and 
emphasising the role of praxis - as informed, committed action. Simmons (2012) 
takes this further by introducing the notion of ‘anti-hegemonic phronetics’, involving 
the deconstruction of dominant ideologies that serve to marginalise and oppress 
people. Flyvberg’s development of Aristotle’s phronesis to include a Foucauldian 
analysis of relations of power means that a ‘phronetic’ approach includes asking 
questions about how power operates: ‘who gains and who loses, by which 
mechanisms of power?’ (Flyvberg, 2001, p. 145).           
 
Taking these features together, the concept of professional ethical wisdom in social 
welfare work may refer to a capacity to: 
 
 Think about and frame both universal questions, such as ‘what counts as a good 
life for human beings?’ and more profession-specific questions, such as ‘what 
counts as just or fair social welfare?’ 
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 Appreciate the ethical complexity of many aspects of professional life; identify 
and attend to workplace issues of moral salience; place these in a larger political 
context of power relations; understand these issues from different perspectives 
and imagine alternatives. 
 Appreciate and show concern for the emotions and perspectives of others; 
express emotions appropriate to professional concerns – such as compassion or 
righteous indignation. 
 Deliberate about and judge what may best contribute to the general social good 
or welfare in a diverse range of circumstances and what is the role of social 
welfare professions in promoting such welfare. 
 Act justly, with honesty, courage, care, trustworthiness and professional integrity.  
 
All this draws on a conception of ethics in professional life that challenges many 
traditional principle-based conceptions of ethics (rational problem-solving through 
applying abstract principles to particular cases) and managerial conceptions of ethics 
(focused on following prescribed rules and procedures). By comparison, these latter 
conceptions of ethics may be regarded as more narrowly defined. Principle-based 
approaches tend to view professional ethics as about decision-making in difficult 
cases (ethics as decision-making, or ‘traditional ethics’), while managerial 
approaches tend to construe professional ethics as conformity to strict ‘top-down’ 
rules (ethics as regulation or ‘new managerial ethics’) (see Banks, 2011). By 
contrast, the present account of ethics in professional life is broader and more open-
ended; it is embedded and embodied in the complex particularities of daily practice, 
requiring more context-sensitive deliberation and judgement (ethics as embedded, or 
‘everyday ethics’) (see Banks 2016). Table 1 summarises the key features of these 
different approaches to ethics, while acknowledging that these are artificial 
distinctions and that they key features identified as characterising each approach are 
not mutually exclusive.  
 
Table 1: Traditional, everyday and new managerial ethics 
 
Traditional 
professional ethics 
Everyday ethics in 
professional life 
New managerial 
ethics 
Ethics as decision-
making 
Ethics as embedded & 
embodied 
Ethics as regulation 
Conduct - focus on 
actions 
Character - e.g. 
courage, integrity 
Competencies - to 
do a specific job 
Codes of ethics - 
focus on principles 
Commitment – 
motivation for 
professional practice 
Conformity - to 
managerial 
prescriptions 
Cases – abstracted 
from context 
Context – structures 
of power, politics & 
personal relationships 
Categories – filling in 
forms, box-ticking 
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Core values – focus 
on respect, rights 
Core values – focus 
on care, social justice 
Core values – focus 
on fairness, good 
outcomes 
     
 
According to the embedded ‘everyday ethics’ approach, ethics concerns more than 
decision-making and/or rule-following. It also concerns the characters of the people 
who have to make the decisions, the relationships people have with others and the 
special and local circumstances in which such decisions are made.  It is about 
everyday, routine actions, thoughts and emotions as well as explicit, difficult 
dilemmas and decisions. It is about being and operating in the turbulent sea of 
professional life -  ‘tacking’ as Saario (2014) describes it  – which, if we continue the 
sailing metaphor, requires local movements of muscles to balance, and tacit 
knowledge of how to lean to one side or another, in addition to explicit decisions 
about when and whether to change course.  On this account, the ethical is so 
intimately interwoven with the practical that it is hard to identify in situ. As Frank 
(2012, p. 64) comments: ‘Practical wisdom becomes visible only at moments of 
confrontation when something significant is at stake’.  Alternatively, using the 
metaphor of the dilemmatic space, only when the ever-present hidden contradictions 
come to the surface as identifiable conflicts are the ethical dimensions of a situation 
apparent. They may then be named and framed in terms of rights, responsibilities, 
harms, benefits, fair treatment and so on. This occurs ‘internally’ through processes 
of reflection and deliberation, and externally through dialogue with others or written 
accounts. So, professional ethical wisdom as a faculty or disposition needs to be 
ever at work – though it may not be consciously or visibly identifiable to oneself or 
others.  
 
Making professional ethical wisdom visible: the role of ethics work   
 
In advocating ‘everyday ethics’ and stressing the importance of social justice and an 
analysis of power, I am clearly situating my approach to phronesis as a project in the 
social sciences as much as in philosophy. Over many years, I have collected 
accounts of self-identified ethical difficulties from social welfare practitioners through 
interviews (Banks, 2004; Banks and Williams, 2005) and written case studies (Banks 
and Nøhr, 2012). In response to requests for verbal or written accounts of ethically 
challenging issues, problems or dilemmas, practitioners have provided post hoc 
narratives from their own perspectives for particular purposes (research interviews or 
case studies). This has disadvantages, in that the stories are inevitably selective: 
practitioners may depict themselves in a particular light (as heroine, victim) and give 
partial or embellished accounts of how they thought, felt or acted. Still, this may not 
be a serious limitation in the context of a search for insights into the nature of 
professional ethical wisdom in practice. For how practitioners construct their stories 
may tell us much about their processes of ethical reflection and deliberation. Indeed, 
the format of interviews and written case studies has advantages in that practitioners 
themselves engage in a process of ‘reflection on action’, which involves abstracting 
what they regard as ethically significant in the situations they are describing. It 
overcomes the problem of outside observers attempting to identify the ethical 
dimensions in everyday practice.   
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This collection of accounts gave me the opportunity to explore what social welfare 
practitioners were reporting themselves as doing, thinking and feeling when they 
encountered ethical difficulties in their practice. It is clear that they had to work hard, 
both at the time, and afterwards – rationally, emotionally, practically – to create 
accounts depicting the situations and themselves in a certain light. This led me to 
introduce the concept of ‘ethics work’ (Banks, 2013, 2016), as a way of describing 
the practice of ethics in everyday professional life. ‘Ethics work’ may be regarded as 
an adaptation of the philosophical concept of phronesis for more professional and 
sociological purposes. The term ‘work’ here is used in much the same sense as in 
‘emotion work’ (Hochschild, 1979, 1983; Rietti, 2009) or ‘identity work’ (Sveningsson 
and Alvesson, 2003; Watson, 2007; Aronson and Smith, 2011). It refers to how 
people construct and perform identities or engender, manage and perform emotions.  
Often associated with social interactionism or social constructionism, ‘emotion work’ 
and ‘identity work’ include the moves people make psychologically, conversationally 
and bodily to perform or achieve a particular persona or state of mind (see 
Goffman,1969). Along similar lines, I describe ‘ethics work’ as:  
 
… the effort people put into seeing ethical aspects of situations, developing 
themselves as good practitioners, working out the right course of action and 
justifying who they are and what they have done. This ‘work’ is complex and 
can be discussed and explained by breaking it down into a number of over-
lapping elements. (Banks, 2013, p. 600) 
 
In this light, I identified six – later seven – elements or dimensions of ethics work as 
follows (taken from Banks, 2016, p. 37):  
 
1. Framing work – identifying and focusing on the ethically salient features 
of a situation; placing oneself and the situations encountered in political 
and social contexts; negotiating/co-constructing frames with others 
(including service users and colleagues).  
2. Role work – playing a role in relation to others (advocate, carer, critic); 
taking a position (partial/impartial; close/distant); negotiating roles; 
responding to role expectations.  
3. Emotion work – being caring, compassionate and empathic; managing 
emotions; building trust; responding to emotions of others. 
4. Identity work – working on one’s ethical self; creating an identity as an 
ethically good professional; negotiating professional identity; maintaining 
professional integrity. 
5. Reason work – making and justifying moral judgements and decisions; 
deliberation with others on ethical evaluations and tactics; working out 
strategies for ethical action. 
6. Relationship work – engaging in dialogue with others; working on 
relationships through emotion, identity and reason work (dialogue work)  
7. Performance work – making visible aspects of this work to others; 
demonstrating oneself at work (accountability work).    
 
A more detailed account of each dimension is given in Banks (2016).    
 
Illustrating ethics work: a psychiatric social worker’s experience 
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In order to illustrate the concept of ethics work, I will focus on just one account by a 
psychiatric social worker of her relationship with and responsibilities towards a 
particular service user she encountered in her work in a hospital. Before 
summarising the social worker’s account, it is important to put this case in context. 
The case is from the USA. As in many countries, psychiatric services in the USA 
tend to be under-resourced and low prestige. Drugs are often used, since ‘talking 
therapies’ or other alternative forms of treatment are usually more costly, time-
consuming or less readily available. If people are regarded as a danger to 
themselves or others they can be compulsorily committed to hospital for observation 
or treatment. In hospitals, social workers work alongside health care staff and may 
belong to multi-disciplinary teams, often led by consultant physicians. I will here 
briefly summarise the social worker’s much longer account, which was written in the 
first person and can be found in Banks and Nøhr (2012, pp.77-79). In what follows, 
names have been changed:  
 
Marian worked as a psychiatric social worker in a 30-bed hospital unit in rural 
Virginia, USA. She gave an account of her work with a man named Carson, who was 
committed as an involuntary patient (under a Commitment Order) due to bizarre 
behaviour in the community and at work, and aggressive behaviour when first 
admitted to hospital under a Temporary Detention Order. A Commitment Order 
requires the patient to remain hospitalised until discharged by a psychiatrist.  
 
Carson was a 40-year old man, who was bright, well-educated and worked for a 
prestigious company. He had a history of bipolar disorder and had been hospitalised 
previously. He maintained he was creative and high spirited rather than bizarre. 
Carson agreed to take Lithium (a mood stabilising drug used to treat bipolar 
disorder) as he felt it was a natural salt his body lacked. But he refused any other 
medication, including anti-psychotic drugs, due to side effects experienced 
previously.  
 
The psychiatrist felt Carson would benefit from an additional mood stabilising drug 
(Depakote) and a low dose of a neuroleptic, and asked Marian to convince Carson to 
take these additional medications. Otherwise an Order to Treat would be invoked. 
Marian was reluctant to take on this responsibility, as she felt Carson should be 
allowed to make his own decisions. She describes her ‘dilemma’ about what role to 
take with Carson, her differences of opinion with the health care staff, the 
uncomfortable atmosphere in the Unit as Carson threatened legal action and 
engaged the support of other patients.  
 
Marian worked with Carson in the face of his insulting behaviour and advocated with 
the psychiatrist for Carson’s right to decide on medication. Carson did agree to take 
Depakote (but not the neuroleptic), and after a week or so his condition had 
improved and he was discharged. For several weeks he sent hostile letters about his 
treatment by hospital staff, singling out Marian and sending her insulting notes. 
Marian reports that she was saddened to hear that he had died several years later 
after an encounter with the police in relation to involuntary hospitalisation.    
 
Framing  
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Marian frames this situation as a dilemma for her, making this comment in her 
written account: 
 
The Order to Treat was a dilemma for me as a social worker in this hospital 
setting. It seemed to me that a client should have the last say about whether 
he or she takes a medication. If the client refuses the prescribed medication, 
then a member of the nursing staff gives the medication by injection while the 
client is restrained. 
 
Yet, as she adds later: 
 
I questioned whether he [Carson] could make an informed decision 
considering his unstable mood state. 
 
She identified client self-determination as a key issue, yet felt other staff did not view 
the situation in this way:  
 
This flew in the face of my professional values of self-determination. I had 
always been passionate about client self-determination. I noticed that the 
other staff had little of my own conflict about this situation with Carson and 
clearly saw him as ‘crazy’ and in desperate need of medication. 
  
Role work 
 
Marian questions the role she should take in this case, particularly whether she 
should be put in the position of persuading Carson to accept medication: 
 
My dilemma was whether it was my responsibility to inform him of the 
potential benefits of the additional medications and let him make an informed 
decision. 
  
She felt that she had taken on the role of advocate for him and later, when Carson 
sent insulting letters singling her out for criticism, she comments: 
 
I believed that I had advocated on his behalf with the psychiatrist for his right 
to refuse the additional medications. I had spent a great amount of time with 
him. 
 
Emotion work  
 
Marian clearly felt strongly about the situation and talks about being ‘passionate’ 
about self-determination. At the time when she was in the midst of working with 
Carson about whether or not to accept the additional medication, she seemed worn 
down by the situation: 
 
I became tired of Carson accusing me of being a ‘lackey for the system’ and 
found myself wishing he would simply be quiet. 
 
Later, when receiving Carson’s insulting letters, she comments that she felt ‘muddled 
and irritated’. Marian does not recount the details of how she handled her emotions, 
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but from the way she tells her story and her brief references to feelings and 
emotions, it appears she found it a challenging case that taxed her emotionally as 
well as rationally. 
 
Identity work  
 
Marian’s account of this case does not reveal a great deal of overt identity work. 
However, she is clearly conscious of maintaining a positive professional identity as a 
social worker – speaking of the dilemma ‘for me as a social worker’ and of ‘my 
professional values of self-determination’. She also distinguishes herself from health 
care staff, who did not share her concerns about this case.  
 
Reason work  
 
In considering an appropriate course of action about whether she should inform 
Carson concerning the benefits of medications and let him make an informed 
decision, Marian mentions questioning ‘whether he could make an informed decision 
given his unstable mood state’. It therefore seems that she did much work with 
Carson to enable him to make an informed decision, although she does not give 
precise details of her discussions with him. Likewise, in advocating on his behalf with 
the psychiatrist, she would have been offering reasons for her advice that Carson be 
allowed to refuse medication.  
 
Relationship work  
 
Her relationship with Carson is at the heart of Marian’s account – though she does 
not go into the precise details of this. After her account of the period when the Unit 
was uncomfortable with Carson’s threat of legal action, she also says:  
 
Meanwhile, the psychiatrist believed that I was being ‘sucked in’ by Carson 
since I expressed reluctance to carry out her recommendations for medication 
compliance. 
 
Marian had to gain the trust of Carson – to try to engage him in rational conversation 
about the medication – in the face of his accusations that she was a ‘lackey of the 
system’. Marian does not give much detail of her relationships with other staff, or 
precisely how she handled the power relations with the psychiatrist.  
 
Performance work 
 
Marian does not explicitly describe how she performed as an ethically concerned 
social worker to her colleagues, and as a caring advocate to Carson. However, it 
would seem from what she writes that she was working hard at this in order that her 
professional position and views might be taken seriously: as she says,‘I believed I 
had advocated on his behalf’; and ‘I had spent a great amount of time with him’.    
 
Marian concludes by reflecting on the significance of her experience of working with 
Carson and relates what happened to him several years later:   
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My experience working with Carson has been one of those cases I have often 
referred back to both in reflection and as part of my teaching. My reactions to 
working with him have illustrated for me that some of our most uncomfortable 
practice experiences can actually be our most fertile learning opportunities. I 
was extremely saddened several years later to learn of Carson’s death. He 
died after a physical encounter with police that occurred during a screening, 
once again, for involuntary hospitalization.  
 
In this passage, she exhibits the qualities of a reflective, caring social worker, who is 
able to learn from challenging experiences. She presents herself as feeling 
appropriate emotion (sadness) in relation to the death of a service user with whom 
she had a close, albeit difficult, relationship.  
 
It is noteworthy that Marian does not reflect in any depth on the power relations of 
the situation, nor the institutional and legal structures that shape her practice. This is 
probably because she takes these for granted as background prevailing conditions, 
and has focused her account on what she sees as the ethical issues in this case.       
 
Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has utilized Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, along with more recent 
developments of this notion in relation to professional life (professional wisdom), as a 
starting point for exploring the ethical dimensions of social welfare work.  I have 
deployed the concept of ‘ethics work’ as a more specific, sociological take on 
professional ethical wisdom and sought to illustrate such work by reference to a 
psychiatric social worker’s account of her practice with a service user and her 
professional relationship with colleagues.  
 
One of the contemporary challenges addressed by the concept of professional 
ethical wisdom is the increasing technicisation of professional practice. The 
dominant managerialist discourse renders invisible the ethics work that practitioners 
undertake in their everyday work - contributing to a humane practice based on a 
social justice mission. It is important that this work is recognized and valued. This 
involves deconstruction of current powerful discourses, reaffirmation of the inherently 
ethical nature of social work practice and cultivation of communities of practitioners 
with collective commitments to professional ethical wisdom and capacities to 
undertake the everyday ethics work this entails. 
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